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Abstract 
Like constructing a building, performance on many contracts occurs in phases. As 
time passes, the promisor sinks more costs into performance and less expenditure 
remains. For phased performance, we show that optimal liability for the breaching party 
decreases as the remaining costs of completing performance decrease. In brief, efficiency 
requires a decreasing liability contract. To implement such a contract, we recommend 
deducting past expenditure on incomplete performance from liability. We show that 
progress payment contracts, which are commonplace in some industries, are materially 
equivalent to decreasing liability contracts. Our analysis should prove useful for 
elucidating progress payment contracts and for drafting and litigating phased contracts.  
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Decreasing Liability Contracts  
 
Robert Cooter and Ariel Porat* 
 
Like constructing a building, performance on many contracts occurs in phases. As 
time passes, the promisor sinks more expenditure into performance and less expenditure 
remains. Unless the parties specify otherwise in the contract, the breaching party in a 
phased contract is liable under positive law for the entire losses suffered by promisee 
because of breach, subject to some well-known limitations.1 This default rule, however, 
often produces inferior incentives. We analyze how liability for breach should ideally 
change through the phases of a contract. We show that deducting past expenditures from 
liability often improves incentives.  
The following example illustrates our analysis. 
Example 1: Promisor’s Sunk Costs—Buyer and Developer make a contract in 
which Buyer immediately pays Developer 90 for promise to construct a building 
that Buyer values at 100. Developer spends 40 on architectural drawings and a 
concrete foundation, which cannot be recovered or reused. Developer defaults. 
Buyer fails to find an alternative builder and abandons the project without 
receiving any benefit from it. Breach causes Buyer to lose 100. Should 
Developer’s liability to Buyer equal 100 or 60?  
                                                
  
Under positive law, liability for breach of a phased contract equals promisee’s expected 
value of performance minus benefit conferred by partial performance.2 In Example 1, 
 
* Robert Cooter is Herman Selvin Professor of Law, University of California at Berkeley. Ariel Porat 
is Dean and Professor of Law, Tel Aviv University Faculty of Law, and Visiting Professor, University of 
Chicago Law School.  
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1 Limitations include unforeseeability, uncertainty and mitigation of damages. See Restatement of the 
Law Second, Contracts 2d §§ 350-2; E. Allan Farnsworth, Contracts (3rd. ed., 1999) 806-35. 
2 Farnsworh, ibid., at p. 803; Restatement of the Law Second, Contracts 2d §347, Comment b. 
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however, there is no benefit to Buyer, so Developer’s liability equals 100. Even so, 
deduction might be desirable. The desirability of deduction depends partly on the 
decision makers’ goals. We especially consider the goal of maximizing the contract’s 
value to its parties. The general question posed by Example 1 is, “How does deducting or 
not deducting past expenditures from breaching party’s liability affect the parties’ 
incentives to maximize the contract’s value?”  
Our answer to this question follows from two simple facts about incentives. First, 
in many circumstances, the promisor will breach or perform depending on which is 
cheaper. When performance occurs in phases, less expenditure remains as time passes, so 
lower damages are typically sufficient to induce performance. Consequently, any 
negative affects on promisor’s incentives from deducing past expenditures decrease with 
time.  
Second, turning from promisor to promisee, we note that promisee can often 
increase the probability of performance or lower its costs by assisting promisor. For 
example, Buyer in Example 1 may assist Developer in obtaining construction permits or 
reveal to him information necessary for performance after the contract was made. 
Reducing damages improves promisee’s incentives to assist promisor’s performance. If 
promisor cannot observe or verify promisee’s assistance, then requiring promisee’s 
assistance by a term in the contract or a rule of law will be ineffective. Furthermore, 
liquidating damages, which effectively prevents promisee’s over-reliance, does not 
induce promise’s assistance.3  
Combining these facts about incentives, we conclude that, when promisor’s 
performance is phased and promisee can assist performance in unobservable or 
unverifiable ways, a decreasing liability contract usually maximizes the contract’s value. 
Liability can decrease at many different rates. For practical reasons that we explain later, 
we recommend a specific rate of decrease. Specifically, we recommend setting breaching 
                                                 
3 Liquidated damages are invariant with respect to reliance. Consequently, liquidated damages solve 
the problem of over-reliance by making promisee internalizes the risk of marginal reliance. Robert Cooter, 
“Unity in Tort, Contract, and Property” 73 Cal. L. Rev. 1 (1985). Liquidated damages, however, do not 
solve the problem of promisee’s assistance. To see this fact, note that the usual formula for optimal 
liquated damages sets them equal to the loss that breach would cause a promisee who relied at the efficient 
level. Under these conditions, however, promisee will be fully compensated for breach, so he has no 
incentive to reduce its probability by assisting promisor.  
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party’s liability equal to promisee’s losses minus breaching party’s past expenditures on 
performance. In Example 1, this recommendation results in liability of 60. 4 
Contracts scholars and transaction lawyers do not currently use our phrase 
“decreasing liability contract.” Many industries, however, use contracts requiring Buyer 
to make payments to Seller for completing each phase of a contract. In the event of 
Seller’s breach, a nonrefundable progress payment is materially equivalent to a deduction 
from Seller’s liability. Progress payment contracts are, consequently, materially 
equivalent to decreasing liability contracts.  
Contracts scholars and transaction lawyers do not speak about “a decreasing 
liability contract.” They are silent, we suspect, because they do not fully appreciate the 
problem of assisting performance. Promisor’s interest in promisee’s assistance, which we 
call the “assistance interest,” has attracted insufficient attention from scholars. The part of 
the problem that they appreciate concerns explicit terms in contracts requiring one party 
to assist the other. To illustrate, Buyer may have an obligation to assist Seller by 
preparing to receive a delivery of goods. Perhaps scholars mistakenly think that contracts 
protect the assistance interest adequately through explicit terms. In fact many contracts 
remain silent about assistance. For example, terms imposing unobservable or unverifiable 
acts are best omitted because enforcement is ineffective. When a contract cannot 
effectively impose an obligation to assist, a deduction from damages must provide the 
required incentives. The problem that scholars neglect and we address is finding the 
optimal deduction from damages to protect the assistance interest. Our analysis should 
prove useful for understanding, drafting, and litigating decreasing liability and progress 
payment contracts. 
Our paper begins with a general discussion of contractual liability and incentive 
effects. Part I contrasts alternative liability rules and Part II explains the ideal contract for 
the promisor and promisee’s incentives. These two sections concern contracts in general, 
                                                 
4 For simplicity we assume throughout the paper that all past costs cannot be recovered or reused. Our 
analysis does not change, however, if part of the costs can be recovered or reused, provided that the 
recovery or reuse has value less than past costs. We could reframe our examples and analysis under the 
more general (but more complicated) assumption that partial performance creates some value that is less 
than past costs. Under positive contract law, if past costs create value for the aggrieved party, breaching 
party’s liability will equal expected value of performance minus the value created. (See supra text 
accompanying note 2.) Deducting the value of partial performance from damages would not change our 
analysis.  
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including both phased and abrupt performance. Parts III and IV turns to phased contracts 
and develops a model of decreasing liability. Part V introduces the possibility of 
renegotiation into the model. Part VI discusses progress payment contracts and other 
implementations. Part VII explains the advantages of decreasing liability contracts over 
other legal mechanisms. Part VIII identifies conditions in which decreasing liability 
contracts are best. Part IX provides perspective and a conclusion about decreasing 
liability contracts. The first appendix develops the main example in the paper more 
explicitly and the second appendix contains a mathematical model with proofs of our 
propositions.  
I. Forms of Liability 
We begin by characterizing some alternative forms of liability. Positive law 
encompasses three major damage measures: expectation, reliance, and restitution.5 
Example 2 represents each one.  
Example 2: Alternative Damages—Buyer and Developer make a contract in 
which Buyer immediately pays Developer 90 for promise to construct a building. 
In reliance on the contract, Buyer spends 5 preparing to move. Buyer values 
performance at 100. Developer spends 40 on architectural drawings and a 
concrete foundation, which cannot be recovered or reused. Developer defaults. 
Buyer fails to find an alternative builder and abandons the project without 
receiving any benefit from it. What is Developer’s liability?  
 
Damages for loss of the contract’s expected value, which is the usual legal 
remedy, require Developer to pay 100 to Buyer. Damages for reliance require Developer 
to return the payment of 90 and also pay 5 in compensation for Buyer’s expenditures on 
moving preparations. Restitution only requires Developer to return the payment of 90. 
The axes in Figure 1 represent the promisor’s liability to pay damages and the promisee’s 
entitlement to receive damages. Notice that this progression from expectation to reliance 
to restitution moves downs the 45o line in Figure 1 from (100,100) to (95,95) to (90,90).6  
Figure 1 applies to all contracts, including contracts where performance is abrupt 
or phased. Now we explicitly relate Figure 1 to phased contracts. In a phased contract, 
decreasing liability implies that the contract moves down the 45o line as the promisor 
                                                 
5 L.L. Fuller & W. Perdue, “The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages” 46 Yale L.J. 53 (1936). 
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goes through the phases of performance. We advocate taking expectation damages as the 
baseline and moving down the 45o line according to the extent of breaching party’s 
expenditures. Expectations is the “baseline” and breaching party’s past expenditures are 
the “deduction.” To illustrate by Example 2, Developer’s breach before he makes any 
expenditures yields liability corresponding to point (100,100), whereas Developer’s 
breach after he spends 40 yields liability corresponding to point (60,60). Thus we propose 
liability of 100 or 60 depending on whether or not promisor has made the expenditures of 
40 by the time of breach.  
 
Figure 1: Liability and Entitlement 
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damages
 
Promisor’s liability to pay damages 
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 95 
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6 Note that punitive damages and disgorgement damages can move up the 45o line past the point 
(100,100). 
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II. Anti-insurance 
How does moving down the 45o line affect the contract’s value? Before answering 
this question, we will explain why the ideal point is not on the 45o line. To have 
incentives to maximize the contract’s value, each party should internalize the contract’s 
costs and benefits for both of its parties. To supply both promisor and promisee with 
efficient incentives, each of them should bear the full loss that breach causes the other 
party, as well as his own loss. In Example 1, Developer internalizes the costs of breach 
when liability to pay damages equals 100. In Example 1, Buyer internalizes the cost of 
breach when the entitlement to receive damages equals 0. Consequently, Figure 1 
describes the point (100,0) as “best” with respect to the incentives of the two parties.7 
In law one party’s liability to pay damages equals the other party’s entitlement to 
receive damages. This is also true for liquidation clauses in contracts that stipulate 
damages. Thus the default rules of positive law and two-party stipulations can be 
represented as points on the 45o line. The best incentives for the two parties, however, 
require promisor’s liability to exceed promisee’s entitlement.8 Specifically, the point 
(100,0) is best for the incentives of both parties.  
To get off the 45o line, the parties must contract with a third party. In another 
paper we propose a mechanism called “anti-insurance” to achieve this result.9 Anti-
insurance is a contract that includes the two parties to the original contract and a third 
party called the “anti-insurer.” In such a contract, promisee assigns his potential right to 
damages to the third party before anyone knows whether a breach will occur, and third 
party pays for the assignment. If a breach subsequently occurs, promisor pays expectation 
damages to third party, and promisee receives no damages, which corresponds to the 
point (100,0) in Figure 1. Consequently, both promisor and promisee internalize the full 
costs of the breach. By improving incentives, anti-insurance can significantly increase the 
value of a contract in principle and the three parties can share in the expected gain. We 
                                                 
7 Conversely, Figure 1 describes the point (0,100) as “worst” with respect to the incentives of the two 
parties. 
8 Getting off the 45o line is called “decoupling” damages paid and received. See A. M. Polinsky & 
Y.K. Che, “Decoupling Liability: Optimal Incentives for Care and Litigation” 22 Rand J.Economics 562 
(1991). 
9 Robert Cooter and Ariel Porat, “Anti-Insurance” 31 J. Leg. Stud. 203 (2002). 
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call such a contract “anti-insurance” because it improves incentives by increasing risk, 
whereas an insurance contract erodes incentives by spreading risk. 
III. Best Constrained Point 
Since anti-insurance is unavailable in markets, this paper does not consider the 
best point in the space of Figure 1. Instead we confine consideration to alternatives on the 
45o line where damages paid by breaching promisor equal damages received by 
promisee. We look for the point on the 45o line that creates incentives for the two parties 
to maximize the contract’s value. Movement along the 45o line involves a tradeoff: 
Starting from any point on the 45o line, moving down the 45o line generally worsens 
promisor’s incentives by externalizing more of the expected harm from breach. However, 
moving down the 45o line generally improves promisee’s incentives to assist promisor’s 
performance. Promisee’s incentives improve because promisee internalizes more of the 
expected gain from assisting promisor’s performance.  
As explained, the 45o line represents different points of a tradeoff between 
promisee’s and promisor’s incentives. Expectation damages (100,100) is an unlikely 
candidate for the best constrained point. At this point the promisor has fully efficient 
incentives to perform, but the promisee has no incentive to assist the promisor. Deducting 
a small amount from damages paid by promisor and received by promisee would 
decrease promisor’s incentive to perform and increase promisee’s incentive to assist. In 
many contracts, the promisee’s first dollar spent on assisting increases the contract’s 
value more than promisor’s last dollar spent on performing. In these circumstances, 
moving slightly down the 45o line from the point (100,100) increases the contract’s value. 
The following proposition, which the appendix proves, summarizes this argument. 
 
Proposition 1: Assume that promisor’s liability for breach equals expectation 
damages. Also assume the first dollar spent by promisee on assisting performance 
increases the contract’s value by more than the last dollar spent by promisor on 
performing. Given these assumptions, a small reduction in damages increases the 
contract’s expected value. 
 
In circumstances described by Proposition 1, the law’s presumption in favor of 
expectation damages does not maximize the contract’s value. Note, however, that the best 
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point on the 45o line is usually much closer to expectation damages (100,100) than to no 
liability (0,0), because the promisor’s incentives are usually more important to the 
contract’s value than the promisee’s incentives. Moving part of the way down the 45o 
line, but much less than half way, will often improve incentives.  
Replacing expectation damages with reliance or restitution damages moves part 
way down the 45o, but much less than half way. Since reliance and restitution damages 
have this effect, the reader might expect us to advocate them. We accept that reliance or 
restitution damages often provide better incentives for the two parties than expectation 
damages. The gain from providing an incentive for promisee’s assistance often exceeds 
the cost of reducing incentives for promisor’s performance. However, the optimal 
distance to move down the 45o line bears no necessary relationship to reliance or 
restitution. Advocating reliance or restitution damages would disguise the reason that we 
regard as most fundamental for reducing damages below the expectation level. 
Incentivizing promisee to assist promisor is a different goal from protecting promisee’s 
reliance or restoring the balance required by fairness. Expectation damages is the correct 
baseline, but the optimal deduction from the baseline does not depend on reliance or 
fairness. A different goal requires a different name.  
We have been discussing damages for breach generally. This paper, however, 
focuses specifically on phased contracts. We will show that in contracts where promisor 
performs in phases and promisee’s assistance matters, deducting breaching party’s past 
expenditures from expectation damages typically provides better incentives than no 
deduction. Consequently, the best name for an optimal phased contract is “decreasing 
liability contract.”  
IV. General Model of Phased Performance With Promisee’s Assistance 
To develop a model of phased contracts, Figure 2 depicts a promisor with 
numerous decisions. At time 0 promisor decides to accept a price p in exchange for a 
promise whose performance creates v for the promisee. To remain consistent with 
Example 2, Figure 2 sets p = 90 and v = 100. Expenditure on performance occurs in 
discrete phases enumerated 1,2,3,…T. At any phase the promisor can choose to default or 
else make an expenditure that is necessary to go on to the contract’s next phase. If 
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expenditure at any time falls below the necessary level, promisor defaults. The downward 
sloping curve in Figure 2 indicates the promisor’s costs that remain to complete 
performance, with the discrete points connected by a continuous curve. To illustrate 
concretely, at time 0 the promisor’s expected remaining costs equal 80, so we have C0 = 
80. In Figure 2, the present time is t. Expenditures before t are in the past, and 
expenditures after t are in the future. At time t, promisor has already spent 40 and he 
expects that 40 more remain, so we have Ct = 40. 
 
Figure 2. Decreasing Expected Costs in Phased Contract   
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Now we characterize how the promisor makes decisions. At each phase t, promisor 
defaults or continues performing according to whether the expected remaining 
expenditures Ct exceed liability Lt, which we write 
  Ct < Lt  => continue performing.     (1) 
  Ct > Lt  => default. 
 
Consider the promisor depicted in Figure 2 who correctly anticipates future costs of 
performance. By the decision rule (1), the promisor will perform provided that liability at 
each point in time exceeds expected future costs Ct. Consequently, we have the following 
proposition, which the appendix proves. 
 
Proposition 2: With each phase of the contract, the expected liability required to 
induce performance decreases. 
 
Thus the minimal liability sufficient to induce performance at each phase corresponds to 
a decreasing liability contract. 
Proposition 2 has several important implications. Compared to a constant liability 
contract, a decreasing liability contract can provide sufficient incentives for promisor to 
perform, while also providing better incentives for promisee to assist. Equivalently, a 
constant liability contract impairs promisee’s incentives unnecessarily, especially near the 
contract’s final phase when very small damages are sufficient to induce promisor to 
perform. 
Now we consider a schedule in which liability equals expectation damages minus 
past expenditures. Figure 3 depicts this liability curve.10 The fact that the cost curve is 
below the liability curve everywhere in Figure 3 implies that performance is cheaper than 
liability at each phase. This observation establishes the following proposition: 
 
Proposition 3: If past expenditures are deducted from expectation damages, and if 
promisor correctly estimates future costs of performance, then promisor performs 
at every phase of the contract.  
 
                                                 
10 The formula is Lt = v – Ct at each point in time t. When promisor’s expectations prove accurate, the 
liability curve always exceeds the expected future cost of performance by the difference between 
promisee’s value of performance and promisor’s initial expected cost of performance, or v – C0. 
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Proposition 3 has an important implication: Predictability favors deducting past 
expenditures from liability. When expenditures are predictable, deducting them provides 
sufficient incentives for promisor and better incentives for promisee.11 
 
Figure 3. Decreasing Liability   
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 In this contract, promisee’s incentives to assist increase as promisor’s 
performance progresses.12 Thus promisee has relatively weak incentives to assist at the 
contract’s beginning and relatively strong incentives at its end. We do not recommend 
                                                 
11 Note that if remaining future expenditure were observable, then liability could equal remaining 
future expenditure plus $1. This rule would eliminate the problem of inefficient breach. Unfortunately, 
remaining future expenditures are usually unobservable, so this liability rule is impractical. 
12 Sometimes the pattern is different. It may happen that breach occurs at a point in time when partial 
performance created value to the promisee that equals past costs. In these circumstances, a decreasing 
liability contract that deducts past costs from expectation damages fully compensates the promisee, 
because damages equal the value of full performance minus the benefit received from part performance.  
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this arrangement because we think that promisee’s incentives are typically more 
important at the contract’s end than its beginning. Rather, we assume that promisor’s 
incentives are more important than promisee’s incentives, so promisee’s incentive should 
be improved only when doing so does not undermine promisor’s incentives. At an early 
stage of the performance, strong promisee’s incentives are too detrimental to promisor’s 
incentives, so the parties cannot afford them. At a later stage, after the promisor incurs 
past costs, the parties can afford improving the incentives of the promisee, because 
promisor’s incentives remain sufficient for performance.  
So far we have analyzed situations where promisor correctly anticipates future 
costs. In these circumstances, Proposition 3 states that performance is induced by a level 
of liability equal to expectation damages minus past expenditures. Now we consider the 
consequences of surprises, which we distinguish into three types: good, bad, and very bad 
news. News about costs is good if past and remaining costs of performance equal or fall 
short of the value of performance to the promisee. To illustrate by our example, news is 
good at time t if remaining costs equal or fall short of 60. An example is the “good news” 
line in Figure 4, where remaining costs at time t equal 40. News is bad if the past and 
remaining costs of performance exceed the value of performance to the promisee. To 
illustrate, news is bad if remaining costs exceed 60.13 The “bad news” line in Figure 4 is 
the lower bound where remaining costs at time t equal 61. News is very bad if the 
remaining costs of performance exceed the value of performance to the promisee. To 
illustrate, news is very bad if remaining costs exceed 100. The “very bad news line in 
Figure 4 is the lower bound where remaining costs at time t equal 101. 
 
                                                 
13 Note that the jump in remaining costs to 61 makes this into a losing contract in the sense that the 
expected total costs (past and future) equal 40+61, whereas the value of performance equals 100. 
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Figure 4: Good, Bad, and Very Bad News 
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According to these definitions, good or bad news (but not very bad) implies that 
remaining costs of performance to promisor are less than its value to promisee. 
Performance, consequently, is efficient. If, however, news is very bad, then remaining 
costs of performance exceed its value, so nonperformance is efficient. The boundary 
between bad and very bad news thus forms the boundary between efficient performance 
and efficient nonperformance. To illustrate by our example, whether performance or 
nonperformance is efficient at time t depends on whether the remaining costs of 
performance exceed or fall short of 100. 
Now we turn to the incentive effects of surprises. As we just explained, efficiency 
requires the promisor to perform in response to good or bad news, and not to perform in 
response to very bad news. Setting liability for breach equal to expectation damages 
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causes the promisor to internalize the benefits of performance to promisee as required by 
efficiency. Consequently, expectation damages cause promisor to perform in response to 
good or bad news, and not to perform in response to very bad news. To illustrate the 
effects of expectations damages by our example, if liability at time t equals 100, then 
promisor performs as long as remaining costs do not exceed 100, and does not perform 
otherwise.  
While expectation damages provide efficient incentives to promisor, lower 
damages do not. Specifically, setting liability equal to expectation damages minus past 
expenditures on performance causes the promisor not to perform in response to bad news, 
which is inefficient. To illustrate by our example, if liability at time t equals 100-40, then 
promisor does not perform as long as remaining costs exceed 60. A decreasing liability 
contract, consequently, causes promisor to respond to bad news by not performing, even 
though efficiency requires performing. Bad news is problematic for promisor’s incentives 
in decreasing liability contracts, but very bad new is unproblematic. A decreasing liability 
contract causes promisor to respond to very bad news by not performing, which is what 
efficiency requires. 
Figure 5 summarizes these facts and the resulting problem. The horizontal axis 
represents remaining costs of performance at time t and the vertical axis represents their 
probability. The three zones in Figure 5 indicate the probability of good, bad, and very 
bad news at time t. In the left zone, news is good and completing performance is 
efficient. In the middle zone, news is bad and completing performance is efficient. In the 
right zone, news is very bad and completing performance is inefficient.  
We have explained that liability for expectation damages provides efficient incentives to 
promisor, regardless of whether news is good, bad, or very bad. Liability for expectation 
damages minus past expenditures on performance, however, provides efficient incentives 
for promisor who receives good or very bad news, and inefficient incentives for promisor 
who receives bad news. If the probability is large that costs fall in the middle range of 
Figure 5, then decreasing liability contracts risk undermining promisor’s incentives. If the 
probability is small that costs fall in the middle range, however, then deducting past 
expenditures from liability runs little risk of undermining promisor’s incentives.  
 
 
 16
Figure 5: Response to Unwelcome Surprises 
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  Note that Figure 3 depicts the vertical distance between the liability curve and the 
expected future cost curve as equal to 20. In Figure 3, 20 is the amount by which future 
costs can exceed original expected costs without affecting promisor’s decision to 
perform. Thus 20 is the margin for error without harmful incentive effects. If costs 
remain on their expected course as depicted in Figure 3, the margin for error remains 
constant in absolute size. However, as the contract progresses through its phases, the 
margin for error increases as a proportion of expected remaining costs. To illustrate, the 
margin for error equals 20/80 or 25% at time 0, and it equals 20/40 or 50% at time t. 
Consequently, the magnitude of the error in predicting future costs required to cause 
breach increases as the contract progresses.  
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These observations yield our fourth proposition: 
 
Proposition 4: Assume that liability equals expectation damages minus past 
expenditures. Also make certain reasonable assumptions about the probability of 
errors in predictions. Then the longer the contract progresses as predicted, the 
lower the probability of breach.  
 
Proposition 4 implies that the probability density in the zone labeled “bad” in Figure 4, 
which is the problematic area for promisor’s incentives, decreases as the contract 
progresses.14  
 Having explained the problem of bad news, we return to the question of why we 
recommend the particular form of a decreasing liability contract in which the 
nonperforming party pays expectations damages minus past costs. Expectation damages 
are the correct baseline because they cause the promisor to internalize fully the cost of 
nonperformance. Past costs are the best deduction for two practical reason. First, past 
costs provide sufficient margin for error that promisor seldom receives bad news that 
causes inefficient nonperformance. The promisor who has sunk costs in the project 
usually has sufficient incentives to perform, even without internalizing the full cost of 
nonperformance. Second, “past costs” are sufficiently easy to observe and verify that 
these terms figure frequently in everyday contracts or legal rules applied to them.  
In some circumstances, adjusting the deduction for past costs makes sense. To 
illustrate, if the parties feel that “bad news” is likely, they might prefer to stipulate a 
deduction equal to half of past costs. Instead of adjusting the deduction for past costs, 
however, the parties might calculate the deduction on an entirely different principle. 
Fundamentally different principles of deduction are easy to imagine, but, on examination, 
they usually have practical or theoretical objections. To illustrate, an appealing 
alternative is to deduct future costs from expectation damages. In reality, however, future 
costs are more speculative and easily manipulated that past costs. The practical advantage 
in drafting contract terms or rules strongly favors past costs rather than future costs. 
  
                                                 
14 An implication of Proposition 4 that we do not investigate here is that, under certain assumptions, 
the optimal contract not only provides for decreasing liability with time, but also liability decreases at an 
increasing rate. For practical reasons such complicated liability schedules are unlikely to be used.  
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V. Renegotiation 
This section asks whether the possibility for renegotiation increases or decreases 
the attractiveness of decreasing liability contracts. Two reasons typically cause parties to 
renegotiate a contract. First, when circumstances change, modifying the contract can 
avoid inefficient behavior and increase the contract’s expected value. As we will explain, 
the possibility of avoiding inefficient behavior by renegotiation makes decreasing 
liability contracts more attractive. Second, when bargaining power changes, one of the 
parties may demand modification to redistribute the contract’s value. Demands for 
redistributive modifications slow performance and waste transaction costs. As we will 
explain, decreasing liability increases the effectiveness of threats of nonperformance by 
irrational promisors and repeat players, which makes decreasing liability contracts less 
attractive. 
We begin our analysis of renegotiation by discussing commitment. In general, an 
actor commits to doing an act by increasing his cost of not doing it. Specifically, making 
an enforceable promise commits the promisor to performing by increasing the cost of not 
performing. A promise is credible so long as performing costs the actor less than not 
performing. We have been discussing a contract whose performance occurs in phases. If 
events unfold as anticipated, promisor finds that performing is cheaper at each phase than 
not performing, so the promise to perform is credible and a threat not to perform is 
incredible. This is true regardless of whether the contract stipulates constant liability or 
decreasing liability.  
What about threats by the promisee not to assist promisor? In our model, 
promisee’s assistance is unobservable and unverifiable. Given this fact, promisee cannot 
effectively promise to assist, nor can promisee effectively threaten not to assist.  
Although promises and threats are ineffective, incentives to assist can be 
effective. As we have shown, a decreasing liability contract gives better incentives for 
promisee’s assistance than a constant liability contract. 
We have explained that, for constant or decreasing liability contracts, threats not 
to perform are incredible so long as events unfold as anticipated. The situation is 
different, however, when promisor receives disappointing news. Figure 5 distinguishes 
disappointing news into “bad news” and “very bad news.” As explained, very bad news is 
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unproblematic, because performance is inefficient and promisor will not perform under a 
constant or decreasing liability contract. Bad news, however, is problematic, because 
performance is efficient and promisor will not perform under a decreasing liability 
contract. In other words, bad news gives promisor a credible threat of nonperformance 
under a decreasing liability contract.15  
Our earlier analysis of Figure 5 concluded that parties who make a decreasing 
liability contract run a risk that bad news will cause inefficient nonperformance. The 
possibility of renegotiation and modification can ameliorates this problem. Instead of 
inefficient breach, promisor can credibly threaten to breach unless promisee agrees to 
modify the contract’s terms and pay promisor more. The parties can presumably agree on 
terms that give each of them a share of the surplus from performing rather than not 
performing. Courts should enforce such a value-increasing modification, where bad news 
motivates renegotiation.  
Our analysis of rational behavior and credible threats concluded that the 
possibility of renegotiation increases the attractiveness of decreasing liability contracts 
relative to constant liability contracts. Now we consider irrational behavior and incredible 
threats. Choosing the action with higher net costs is ordinarily irrational, but people 
sometimes do it. For example, experiments in behavioral economics show that people 
will often reduce their own objective payoffs to prevent someone else from gaining an 
unfair advantage.16 As another example, a repeat player may undertake the more costly 
action in a particular situation to gain the future advantage of a reputation for toughness. 
In this situation, the repeat player’s local irrationality is globally rational.  
A threat is effective, whether rational or not, if the hearer believes that the speaker 
may act on it. The speaker is presumably more likely to act if the threatened action costs 
less. Consequently, promisor’s threat against promisee is presumably more effective if 
the threatened action costs the promisor less. To illustrate, assume that not performing 
cost promisor 50 and performing costs promisor 40. Since promisor loses 10 from 
nonperforming, promisor’s threat not to perform is incredible. If promisor is irrational or 
                                                 
15 Cf. Ian Ayres and Kristin Madison, “Threatening Inefficient Performance of Injunctions and 
Contracts” 148 U. Pa. L. Rev. 45 (1999-2000). 
16 Ernest Fehr and Simon Gachter, “Altruistic Punishment in Humans” 415 Nature 137 (2002). 
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a repeat player, however, promisor’s threat may be effective. Presumably the threat 
would be even more effective if nonperformance causes promisor to lose 5 rather than 10 
Holding constant the probability that the threatening party will act, the threat is 
also more effective if its consequences are worse for the threatened party. To illustrate, 
promisor’s threat not to perform is more effective if promisee losses from 
nonperformance increase from 20 to 25.  
With these observations in mind, we compare the effectiveness of promisor’s 
threats in constant and decreasing liability contracts. In terms of Figure 1, a constant 
liability contract is a point on the 45o line, and a decreasing liability contract is a 
movement down the 45o. Lower liability makes the threat of nonperformance less costly 
for the promisor to carry out, which increases its effectiveness. Similarly, lower damages 
make nonperformance more costly to the promisee, which also increases the threat’s 
effectiveness. So, starting from any constant liability level, decreasing liability below that 
level increases the effectiveness of the promisor’s threat not to perform, and the threat 
becomes more effective if liability decreases with time. 
To summarize our analysis, the possibility of renegotiation makes decreasing 
liability contracts more attractive by reducing the probability of inefficient 
nonperformance and less attractive by increasing promisees’ vulnerability to threats of 
nonperformance by repeat players and irrational promisors.   
VI. Progress Payment Contracts and Other Implementations 
Earlier we explained that transaction lawyers use progress payments to achieve 
the same incentive effects as decreasing liability. We will explain how to choose 
parameters so that any decreasing liability contract is equivalent to a progress payment 
contract, and vice verse. First, however, we need to discuss the general problem of the 
timing of payments.  
In Example 1, Buyer pays 90 upfront for Developer’s promise to build the 
building. Instead of paying upfront, assume that Buyer wants to postpone payment until 
time T, when the building is scheduled for completion. Postponing payment until time T 
makes no difference to our analysis so long as Buyer’s obligation to pay depends only on 
time. To illustrate, Buyer in Example 1 could pay Developer upfront with a bond of 90 
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that falls due at time T. Using a bond shifts Buyer’s payment in time, and, assuming 
Buyer’s solvency, leaves the other features of the contract unchanged, including its 
incentive effects. 
The analysis changes, however, if Buyer’s obligation to pay depends on 
Developer’s performance. To illustrate, we modify our example so that Buyer promises 
to pay contingent on Developer completing the building.  
Example 3: Buyer’s Contingent Payment—Buyer and Developer make a contract 
in which Buyer promises to pay 90 for Developer’s construction of a building that 
Buyer values at 100. The contract stipulates that the full payment falls due on 
completion of the building. Developer spends 40 on architectural drawings and a 
concrete foundation, which cannot be recovered or reused. Developer defaults. 
Buyer fails to find an alternative builder and abandons the project without 
receiving any benefit from it. Breach causes Buyer to lose 10, which is the 
difference between the Buyer’s value of performance and the contract price.  
 
When positive law is applied to Example 3, Developer who breaches after phase 1 
must pay expectation damages of 10. Expectation damages, however, create an incentive 
problem that we have already analyzed. Specifically, Developer’s liability of 10 makes 
Buyer indifferent between Developer’s performance or breach, so Buyer has deficient 
incentive to assist Developer’s performance. In contrast, a decreasing liability contract 
gives Buyer an incentive to assist Developer.  
To improve incentives, the parties in Example 3 might change their contract into a 
decreasing liability contract. To create decreasing liability, the contract should stipulate 
that breaching Developer pays expectation damages minus past expenditures on 
performance. Note that Developer who breaches after the contract’s first phase owes 
expectation damages of 10 minus past expenditures of 40, or liability of –30, which 
means that Buyer owes 30 to Developer. “Negative liability”17 of 30 seems odd if you 
think of Developer as getting paid 30 to breach. The result, however, does not seem odd 
if you think of Developer as getting 30 if he breaches and 90 if he performs, for a net loss 
of 60 from nonperformance. 
Actual contracts often achieve the equivalent result through progress payments. In 
a typical contract, Buyer promises to make progress payments to Developer for 
completing each phase of the project and to pay a bonus for completing the entire project. 
                                                 
17 Thanks to Barry Adler for suggesting this phrase. 
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In the event that Developer does not complete the project, the parties just walk away. 
That is, Developer retains the progress payments and Buyer receives no damages.—We 
modify our example to embody these facts.  
Example 4: Progress Payment Contract—Buyer and Developer make a contract 
for the latter to construct a building that Buyer values at 100. In the first phase, 
Developer will spend 40 on architectural drawings and a concrete foundation. 
After Developer completes the first phase, Buyer will make a progress payment of 
40. After these steps, Buyer or Developer can renounce the contract with no 
further consequences. If the contract is renounced, architectural plans and 
concrete foundation cannot be recovered or reused. In the second phase (assuming 
there is one), Developer will complete the building at an additional cost of 40. 
Buyer will make another progress payment of 40 plus a completion bonus of 20.  
 
Now we want to show the material equivalence of incentive effects in progress 
payment contracts and decreasing liability contracts. First consider the incentives of 
Developer to renounce the contract in Example 4 after phase one. Developer will 
renounce or complete depending on the difference in payoffs. By renouncing (which is 
not a breach of contract), Developer’s future net payments equal 0. By completing, 
Developer’s future net payments equal the completion bonus. So the completion bonus of 
20 represents Developer’s incentive to complete rather than renounce.  
Compare this to the decreasing liability contract. In the later, Developer who 
breaches after phase one pays expectation damages of 100 minus past costs of 40, for a 
net payment of 60, and Developer who decides to complete performance will spend an 
additional 40. So the difference between 60 and 40, which equals 20, represents 
Developer’s incentive to complete performance rather than breach.  
We explained that incentives for promisor to perform are 20 for the progress 
payment contract and 20 for the decreasing liability contract. Thus the Developer’s 
incentive to perform are materially equivalent under the two contracts. Next we show the 
material equivalence of Promisee’s incentives to assist.  
If Developer renounces the progress payment contract after completing phase one, 
Promisee’s future net payoffs equal 0. If Developer completes phase one and then decides 
to complete phase two, Promisee’s future net payoffs equal the value of performance, 
100, minus progress payments in phase two of 40 and the completion bonus of 20, for a 
net payoff of 40. So 40 represents Promisee’s incentive to assist Developer in phase 2.  
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Now compare to the decreasing liability contract. In the later, Developer who 
breaches the contract after phase one pays Promisee the value of performance 100 minus 
costs incurred of 40, for a net payoff of 60. If Developer completes the contract, Promisee 
receives the value of performance 100. So 40 represents Promisee’s incentive to assist 
Developer in phase 2.  
We have explained that the incentives for promisee to assist are 40 for the 
progress payment contract and 40 for the decreasing liability contract. 
  Now we state the generalization underlying this example, which the appendix 
proves. 
Proposition 5: For any decreasing liability contract, there exists a progress payment 
contract with materially equivalent incentives for promisor’s performance and promisee’s 
assistance, and vice versa. 
 
Although very difference in appearance, appropriate choice of parameters makes these 
two contractual forms materially equivalent.18 Progress payments are common in a 
variety of contractual settings involving interdependence between the parties, where 
unobservable and unverifiable assistance is required. Examples include making a movie, 
building a computer program to buyer’s specifications, retaining an attorney in complex 
litigation, or most complex construction projects.19  
VII. Mechanisms in Contract Law to Give Efficient Incentives to Both 
Parties  
We recommend that transaction lawyers use decreasing liability contracts for 
conditions where both parties need incentives to increase the contract’s value. The law 
has legal mechanisms to induce promisee’s assistance and promisor’s performance. 
Unlike decreasing liability contracts, however, these mechanism cannot reach 
unobservable or unverifiable forms of effort. We cannot discuss all of these mechanisms, 
                                                 
18 Note this difference in our example: The progress payment contract in Example 4 gives all of the 
surplus to Developer, whereas the decreasing liability contract we discussed divides the surplus equally 
between them (v = 100; P = 90; C = 80). To make Example 4 produce an equal division of the surplus, we 
could add this sentence. “On signing the contract, Developer gives 10 to Buyer as proof of commitment to 
proceed.” In general, payments made at the contract’s beginning influence the attractiveness of making the 
contract, but do not necessarily effect future behavior. 
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but we will discuss some of them. Specifically, we will discuss stipulating a duty to 
assist, a defense of comparative negligence, and limiting damages to reliance damages or 
some other measure of damages smaller than expectation damages.—We will not discuss 
mitigation of damages and liquidated damages, which reduce promisee’s over-reliance 
without improving promisee’s incentives to assist in performance.20  
Stipulating an explicit duty to assist in performance. When assistance by the 
promisee is observable and verifiable, stipulating a duty to assist (or making assistance by 
the promisee a precondition to performance) is a possible way to improve the promisee’s 
incentives. Besides being possible, this is a good way when the transaction costs of 
drafting the relevant terms are moderate. However, this mechanism is ineffective when 
drafting is too costly or the promisee’s assistance is unobservable or unverifiable. In these 
circumstances, a decreasing liability contract is desirable because it does not suffer from 
these limitations.  
Comparative negligence defense. The comparative negligence (or fault) defense, 
which is generally not recognized by American contract law, is a second mechanism that 
can give efficient incentives to both parties to the contract.21 Under the comparative 
negligence rule, promisee’s unreasonable failure to assist performance may reduce 
damages from breach.22 Like the previous mechanism, however, the comparative 
negligence defense suffers from one main drawback: It is effective only when assistance 
is observable and verifiable.  
Limiting liability. A third mechanism is limiting liability to reliance damages or to 
any other measure of damages that is below expectation damages.23 To illustrate by 
Example 1, the contract could stipulate that liability equals 80 instead of 100. In contrast 
                                                                                                                                                 
19 Victor Goldberg analyzes various complex contracts with some of these features. See Victor 
Goldberg, “Bloomer Girl Revisited or How to Frame an Unmade Picture” [1998] Wisc. L. Rev. 1051 
(1998); Victor Goldberg, “The Net Profits Puzzle” 97 Colum. L. Rev. 524 (1997).  
20 The mitigation of damages defense is effective only after breach (or anticipatory breach) and 
therefore does not affect pre-breach reliance. As to liquidated damages, see supra note 3. 
21 Although it gained some recognition in warranty cases, probably because of their affinity to tort 
cases. See James J. White & Robert S. Summers, Uniform Commercial Code 410-13 (5th ed., 2000). 
22 For comparative negligence in contracts, and for various attitudes toward it in various jurisdictions, 
see Ariel Porat, “Contributory Negligence in Contract Law: Toward a Principled Approach” 28 U. B. C. L. 
Rev. 141 (1994); Ariel Porat, Comparative Fault in Contract Law (1997) (Hebrew). For a comparative 
negligence approach in contracts , see S.J. Groves Co. v. Warner Co. 576 F. 2d 524 (3d Cir. 1978).  
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to the preceding mechanisms, limiting liability will improve the promisee’s incentives to 
assist, even if his behavior is unobservable and unverifiable. This mechanism, however, 
is generally inferior to decreasing liability for phased contracts. In phased contracts, the 
optimal damage schedule is dynamic and adapts the level of damages to changed 
circumstances. The changed circumstances are the changing amount of past costs, which 
cannot be recovered or reused. As more costs sink into performance, the efficient level of 
damages, taking into account both parties incentives, decreases. Consequently, for any 
constant damage measure, a superior decreasing damage measure exists.  
VIII. Identifying Contracts in Which Efficiency Requires Decreasing 
Liability  
The preceding model identified two factors that determine the efficiency of 
decreasing liability: the benefit of improving the promisee’s incentives and the cost of 
undermining the promisor’s incentives. In this section we elaborate on these two factors 
and characterize contracts where decreasing liability is best. 
A. Improving the Incentives of the Promisee 
 Promisee can often assist performance and take precaution against breach in 
various ways. To the extent that these efforts are unobservable or unverifiable, a legal 
duty to perform them is unenforceable, regardless of whether the duty is stipulated in the 
contract or inferred from a legal doctrine such as contributory or comparative fault.24 In 
such circumstances, however, under-compensation gives the promisee an incentive to 
assist, and the incentive increases as damages decrease. To illustrate by Example 1, 
under-compensation gives Buyer an incentive to help Developer to obtain building 
permits and reveal information necessary for performance after the contract was made, 
even if the efforts are unobservable or unverifiable. This example exemplifies a wide 
category of cases where promisee’s assistance in performing the contract could prevent a 
breach or reduce its likelihood.  
                                                                                                                                                 
23 For the argument that reliance damages supply better incentives to the promissee to cooperate than 
expectation damages or liquidated damages, see Yeon-Koo Che and Tai-Yeong Chung, “Contract 
Damages and Cooperative Investments” 30 Rand J. Econ. 84 (1999). 
24 Supra. 
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Sometimes courts recognize the importance of assistance by the recipient of 
performance, and even imply comparative negligence-like principles or contractual duties 
of cooperation. Some examples are elaborated in the footnote.25 Note, however, that 
unobservable or unverifiable contractual or legal obligations are ineffective.  
  
Next we describe some forms of promisee’s assistance where observation or 
verification is difficult.  
Example 5: Revealing Information Necessary for Performance—Developer 
promises to build a building for Buyer. After partly performing, Developer 
encounters difficulties in completing performance due to geological obstacles to 
construction. Buyer easily could have acquired information concerning those 
obstacles, but refrained from doing so.26 Buyer’s lack of effort is unobservable 
and unverifiable. Developer begins construction and encounters geological 
obstacles that cause default. 
 
Expectation damages from breach in Example 5 gives Buyer no incentive to 
acquire or disclose information concerning geological difficulties. The situation changes 
when damages fall below the expectation level. Each fall in damages gives Buyer 
                                                 
25 See: AMPAT/Midwest v Illinois Tool Works, Inc. 896 F.2d 1035, 1041 (7th Cir. 1990), where 
Judge Posner said: “. . . the parties to a contract are embarked on a cooperative venture, and a minimum of 
cooperativeness in the event of unforeseen problems arise at the performance stage is required even if not 
an explicit duty of contract”.  
Similarly, in Market Associates v. Frey, 941 F.2d 588, 595-96 (7th Cir. 1991), Judge Posner 
maintained: “It is true that an essential function of contracts is to allocate risk. . . . But contracts do not just 
allocate risk. They also (or some of them) set in motion a cooperative enterprise… which may to some 
extent place one party at the other’s mercy... At the formation of the contract the parties are dealing in 
present realities; performance still lies in the future. As performance unfolds, circumstances change, often 
unforeseeably; the explicit terms of the contract become progressively less apt to the governance of the 
parties’ relationship… and the scope and bite of the good faith doctrine grows”.  
For a case where the court reduced damages due to the non cooperation of the plaintiff, see S.J. Groves 
Co. v. Warner Co. 576 F. 2d 524 (3d Cir. 1978). Groves was a subcontract for the replacement of a bridge's 
concrete decks parapets. Groves contracted with Warner for the delivery of concrete to the site. Because of 
defaults of Warner in performance Groves had to remove and replace defective slab from the site. Groves 
sued Warner for his losses. It was proved that Groves's crew also functioned inefficiently and weather 
conditions were extremely unfavorable. The district court found Werner liable for breach of contract, but 
award Groves only for one-fourth of the losses associated with the slab. The Federal Court of Appeal for 
the 3rd Circuit affirmed the trial court decision, reasoning that since both parties contributed to the loss “… 
The action of the trial judge in dividing the loss between the parties was a fair solution to a difficult 
problem…”. For another case of the same type, see Lesmeister v. Dilly 330 N.W. 2d 95 (Minn. 1983).  
26  Alternatively, Buyer refrained from obtaining the information for fear that Developer would 
accuse him of possessing it when the parties originally contracted. Generally, courts are not willing to 
recognize one party's implied duty to provide the other with information during the performance of the 
contract. See H. Collins, “Implied Duty to Give Information During Performance of Contracts” (1992) 55 
M.L.R. 556. Cf Bank of Nova Scotia v. Hellenic Mutual War Risks Association (Bermuda) Ltd, The Good 
Luck [1989] 3 All E. R. 628, 664 et seq. (C.A.). 
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stronger incentives to acquire and disclose the information. Foreseeing these facts, the 
parties might recognize that a decreasing liability contract improves incentives relative to 
a constant liability contract.  
 Now we turn to an example of misunderstandings. 
Example 6. Clarifying Misunderstandings—Seller mistakenly renders defective or 
delayed performance, thus breaching the contract. Buyer knew or could easily 
have known about Seller’s misunderstanding but did not take any steps to prevent 
it. Had Buyer clarified the misunderstanding, Seller would not have breached the 
contract. Proving that a misunderstanding caused Seller’s breach or that Buyer 
knew or could easily have known about Seller’s misunderstanding, is difficult or 
impossible.27 
  
By assumption, stipulating a duty by Buyer to clarify misunderstandings in Example 6 is 
ineffective. Under-compensating Buyer, however, would encourage him to prevent 
misunderstandings.  
  
Finally we turn to an example of high losses. 
Example 7. Warning for Potentially High Losses—Seller promises to deliver 
unique goods to Buyer. When contacting, the parties recognize that Buyer’s value 
                                                 
27 In Market Associates v. Frey 941 F.2d 588 (7th Cir. 1991), the Court of Appeal of the Seventh 
Circuit (Judge Posner) decided that there is a duty on a contracting party not to take advantage of an 
oversight by the other party to the contract concerning rights and duties under the contract: 
“…[E]ven after you have signed a contract, you are not obliged to become an altruist toward the other 
party and relax the terms if he gets into trouble in performing his side of the bargain. . . . But it is one thing 
to say that you can exploit your superior knowledge of the market—for if you cannot, you will not be able 
to recoup the investment you made in obtaining that knowledge—or that you are not required to spend 
money bailing out a contract partner who has gotten into trouble. It is another thing to say that you can take 
deliberate advantage of an oversight by your contract partner concerning his rights under the contract. Such 
taking advantage is not the exploitation of superior knowledge or the avoidance of unbargained-for 
expense; it is sharp dealing. Like theft, it has no social product, and also like theft it induces costly 
defensive expenditures, in the form of over elaborate disclaimers or investigations into the trustworthiness 
of a prospective contract partner, just as the prospect of theft induces expenditures on locks… Before the 
contract is signed, the parties confront each other with a natural wariness. Neither expects the other to be 
particularly forthcoming, and therefore there is no deception when one is not. Afterwards the situation is 
different. The parties are now in a cooperative relationship the costs of which will be considerably reduced 
by a measure of trust. So each lowers his guard a bit, and now silence is more apt to be deceptive… 
[I]mmensely sophisticated… enterprises make mistakes just like the rest of us, and deliberately to take 
advantage of your contracting partner's mistake during the performance stage (for we are not talking about 
taking advantage of superior knowledge at the formation stage) is a breach of good faith. To be able to 
correct your contract partner's mistake at zero cost to yourself, and decide not to do so, is a species of 
opportunistic behavior that the parties would have expressly forbidden in the contract had they foreseen it. 
The immensely long term of the lease amplified the possibility of errors but did not license either party to 
take advantage of them.” 
For a thorough discussion of this case, see Melvin A. Eisenberg, “The Duty to Rescue in Contract 
Law”, Fordham Law Review (2002). 
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of performance is uncertain and it could be 100 or 500. After contracting, Buyer 
receives unverifiable information that performance will be worth 500. Buyer 
wishes to keep the information confidential and does not tell Seller. Seller realizes 
that performing will cost 150. Consequently, Seller prefers to breach if liability 
equals 100 and to perform if liability equals 500. 
Seller mistakenly thinks his liability for breach will be 100, so he breaches.  
  
In Example 7, the high losses of 500 from breach are foreseeable under the Hadley v. 
Baxendale rule. Consequently, breaching Seller cannot invoke the “unforeseeability 
defense.” An obligation of Buyer to disclose unverifiable information is ineffective, 
regardless of whether the obligation is stipulated in the contract or imputed to it as a 
matter of law.28 As in the other two examples, reducing damages below the expectation 
level would encourage Buyer to convey information about the value of performance to 
Seller so that he will perfo.  
B. Undermining the Efficient Incentives of the Promisor to Perform 
By our definitions, news is “bad” (but not very bad) when the total costs of 
performance modestly exceed its value, and bad news distorts promisor’s incentives. 
Thus a low probability that the cost of performance modestly exceeds its value favors 
decreasing liability contracts. For this result, the following considerations are usually 
decisive:  
Length of Performance.  When the time needed for performance is short, the risk 
that costs of performance will exceed its value is typically low. In these circumstances, a 
                                                 
28Cf. Charles Goetz & Robert Scott, “The Mitigation Principle: Toward a General Theory of 
Contractual Obligation” 69 Va. L. Rev. 967, 1012-14 (1983); Porat, supra note; Eisenberg, ibid. 
In legal systems that do not adopt the foreseeability test regarding the remoteness of damages we do 
find a larger group of cases where the negligent failure of the promissee to warn the promisor from a large 
potential loss is considered as contributory (or comparative) negligence. Such is the case in the German 
legal system, where the remoteness of damage test is one of “adequate cause.” Article 254 of the BGB, 
which establishes the contributory negligence defence in torts as well as in contract law, makes it clear that 
the defence also applies “if the fault of the injured party consisted only in an omission to call the attention 
of the debtor to the danger of unusually high damage which the debtor neither knew nor should have 
known” (I. S. Forrester, S.L. Goren, H. Ilgen (trans.), The German Civil Code (Amsterdam & Oxford, 
1975)). In Germany, this article is often interpreted to mean that the party in breach is released from all 
liability for damages, and as applicable even when the aggrieved party's failure to warn stems from 
negligent ignorance of the foreseeable consequences of a breach of the contract. Note that, in German law, 
even when the loss foreseen by the aggrieved party due to breach of contract is not particularly large, the 
burden of warning applies as long as the party in breach could not, as a reasonable person, anticipate the 
occurrence of the type of loss that actually came about. Munchen Kommentar zum Burgerliches 
Gesetzbuch, Band II (Munchen, 1985), Grunsky, §254, s. 14, §254, ss. 39-42. 
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decreasing liability contract is a good way to induce unverifiable assistance in 
performance by the promisee. 
Stable markets.   Performance often requires the promisor to purchase inputs. 
Stable markets for inputs reduce the probability of “bad news.” To illustrate, when the 
price and supply of working materials and manpower is predictable, decreasing liability 
contracts pose little risk of creating incentives for inefficient breach. Conversely, unstable 
markets for inputs create risk that an increase in costs will cause promisor to breach 
inefficiently.  
In some circumstances, the parties can solve the problem of unstable markets for 
inputs without abandoning the advantages of a decreasing liability contract. To solve the 
problem, the promisee may assume the risk of market fluctuations. To illustrate, Buyer 
might agree to reimburse seller for an increase in the cost of construction materials. In 
these circumstances, the risk that input costs will increase need not prevent the parties 
from adopting a decreasing liability contract. 
The risk that a decreasing liability contract will cause inefficient breach relates to 
the time-pattern of market fluctuations. News of rising costs is more likely to cause 
promisor’s breach when received in an early phase, because more inputs remain to be 
purchased. When breach occurs early enough so that promisor has made little or no 
expenditures, the deductibility of expenditures makes little or no difference to liability. 
Consequently, early receipt of bad news does not cause a significant different in 
decreasing liability contracts as compared to constant liability contracts.  
Conversely, news of rising costs is less likely to cause promisor’s breach when 
received in a later phase, because few inputs remain to be purchased. Consequently, late 
receipt of bad news is unlikely to cause inefficient breach of a decreasing liability 
contract.  
The greatest risk that a decreasing liability contract will cause inefficient breach 
occurs when promisor receives bad news in the middle phases of the contact. When 
drafting the contract, the parties should keep this fact in mind when they compare the 
time-pattern in the contract’s phases to possible market fluctuations.  
We have discussed the potential problem that unstable input prices pose for 
decreasing liability contracts. A similar problem concerns unstable output prices. When 
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output prices are unstable, a third party may appear and offer Seller more than Buyer 
promised to pay in the contract. To illustrate by our first example, Developer might get a 
bid from a third party during performance that he can accept only if he defaults on the 
original contract with Buyer.  
The third party presents an opportunity to Developer that will be lost by 
performance on the contract. The cost of performing includes the cost of inputs and the 
lost opportunity. Consequently, the analysis of unstable input and output prices is 
essentially the same. When the output price is predictable, decreasing liability contracts 
pose little risk of creating incentives for inefficient breach. Conversely, unstable output 
markets for inputs create risk that an increase in output prices will cause promisor to 
breach inefficiently. As with unstable input prices, the parties can solve the problem of 
unstable output prices without abandoning the advantages of a decreasing liability 
contract by the promisee assuming the risk. To illustrate, Buyer might agree to reimburse 
Seller for loss of an opportunity to sell to a third party.  
Correlated costs and value of performance.   The cost of performance and its 
value are sometimes correlated. The correlation often exists because an increase in 
production costs causes an increase in the product’s value. To illustrate, an increase in the 
cost of construction may increase the value of the existing stock of buildings.  
Consider the consequences for a contract stipulating liability equal to expectation 
damages minus actual costs. As long as expectation damages increase by the same 
amount as remaining costs, the former offsets the latter, so the change in prices does not 
induce promisor to breach. Consequently, bad news about remaining costs of 
performance correlates with bad news about liability for breach, so the difference 
between them remains constant. In these circumstances, the parties can stipulate 
decreasing liability without fear that price changes will cause inefficient breach.  
Promisor’s inefficient investment in performance.   In our model, Promisor must 
make expenditures in an early phase of performance in order to go on to the next phase. 
Furthermore, our model assumes that expenditures in each phase are binary -- either 
expenditures are sufficient to go to the next phase, or expenditures are insufficient and 
the promisor cannot perform. Our model allows no time-shifting of expenditures on 
performance. The real world, however, usually permits some time-shifting. In most 
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phased contracts, higher expenditures in a later phase can make up for lower expenditures 
in an earlier phase. Also, in the real world, higher expenditures in any phase often 
increase the probability of completing performance later. 
A less tractable and more realistic model than ours would allow a flexible time-
pattern of expenditures on performance. We make no attempt to construct such a model, 
but we mention a new problem for decreasing liability contracts that we anticipate. In a 
constant liability contract with expectation damages, promisor internalizes 100% of the 
costs of breach, regardless of when it occurs. However, in a decreasing liability contract, 
the promisor internalizes a variable percentage of the costs of breach, depending on when 
it occurs. With a flexible time-pattern of expenditures on performance, a decreasing 
liability contract may enable the promisor to shift expected costs to the promisee by 
shifting expenditures forward in time. Promisor who expects to gain from shifting 
expenditures forward in time will not take account of negative effects on promisee, which 
are the reduction in damages promisee expects to receive in the event that promisor 
breaches early in the contract.29 Even in these circumstances, however, decreasing 
liquidated damages might solve the problem.30 
Litigation costs.   We will briefly discuss litigation costs. In any decreasing 
liability contract, promisor’s liability for breach decreases with time, so promisee’s 
recovery also decreases with time. In the decreasing liability schedule that we 
recommend, promisee’s recovery equals promisee’s value of performance minus 
                                                 
29 To illustrate, assume the contract in Example 1 stipulates that Developer who breaches at time t pays 
expectation damages V = 100 minus expenditures on partial performance Ct. If Developer breaches at time 
t after expenditures of 40, Developer’s liability equals 60. Consequently, breach at time t results in 
Developer’s total costs of 40 + 6 = 100. Now assume that technology changes and allows Developer to 
shift costs of 30 from after time t to before time t. Consequently, breach at time t results in Developer’s 
total costs of 70+30=100. Since Developer’s cost of breach are constant regardless of whether or not he 
shifts costs forward in time, he will decide whether or not to make the shift purely on the basis of whether 
his costs of performance rise or fall. Thus he will shifts costs forward in time if he saves 1 in costs of 
performance.  
When he shifts costs forward in time, however, Buyer’s damages from breach fall by much more than 
1. Specifically, Buyer’s damages from Developer’s breach at time t fall from 60 to 30. If the probability of 
breach is significant, shifting costs forwards in time is inefficient, but Developer gains an advantage by 
doing so. 
30 Instead of stipulating that breaching promisor can deduct actual expenditures, the contract might 
stipulate the exact deduction in dollars allowed after breach at each phase. The parties might try to 
liquidate damages equal to expectation damages minus optimal expenditure, regardless of actual 
expenditures. Liquidated decreasing liability requires a lot of information. Also it may not solve the 
problem of time-shifting to lower the probability of breach, as opposed to time-shifting to lower the cost of 
performance. 
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promisor’s costs. As performance approaches completion, promisee’s recovery 
approaches promisee’s value of performance minus promisor’s cost of performance, 
which is the value created by the contract. Our recommended decreasing liability 
schedule thus gives a credible threat to sue throughout contract’s life so long as the 
contract’s value exceeds litigation costs. If, however, plaintiff’s costs of litigation exceed 
the contract’s value, then the contract no longer has a credible threat to sue 
nonperforming promisor and the contract becomes ineffective. If the parties foresee that 
these circumstances are likely, they gain by making a different contract in damages 
decrease at a slower rate.  
To illustrate by Figure 3, promisee’s damages fall from 100 at time 0 to 20 at 
time T. Promisee in Figure 3 has a credible threat to sue for nonperformance throughout 
the contract’s life so long as his litigation costs do not exceed 20. If, however, promisee’s 
cost of litigation exceed 20 and equal, say, 30, then the credibility of his threat to sue 
nonperforming promisor disappears when damages fall to 30. Foreseeing this fact, the 
parties should stipulate a liability schedule that decreases more slowly so that damages 
always exceed 30. 
IX. Conclusion 
The economic analysis of contracts clarified debates over alternative liability 
rules, especially by demonstrating that ideal expectation damages cause promisor to 
internalize the cost of breach to the promisee. Relying on this insight, most law and 
economics scholars have commended expectation damages as more efficient than any 
alternative. This conclusion, however, loses sight of promisee’s incentives to assist 
promisor’s performance. The economic analysis of contracts has discussed the problem 
of promisee’s reliance, but not promisee’s assistance.31  
The standard argument for expectation damages is not justified in contracts where 
promisee’s unverifiable assistance significantly affects performance. In these 
circumstances, efficient incentives for both parties require promisee to assign the right to 
expectation damages to a third party (“anti-insurer”). In the absence of such an 
assignment, reducing liability below the level of expectation damages usually increases 
                                                 
31 Supra note 3.  
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efficiency. To be precise, reducing liability below expectation damages increases 
efficiency when promisor’s last dollar spent on performing increases the contract’s value 
less than promisee’s first dollar spent on assisting.  
For this reason, we advocate reducing damages below the expectation level 
whenever promisee’s unverifiable assistant significantly affects performance. Reliance or 
restitution damages typically achieves such a reduction, but we do not advocate them. 
Instead, we advocate a damage measure whose justification relates directly to the goal of 
improving promisee’s incentives to assist promisor. For phased contracts, the promisor’s 
remaining costs of performance ordinarily decrease as each phase is completed. 
Consequently, the level of liability required to induce performance also decreases. A 
contract that stipulates decreasing liability can provide sufficient incentives for promisor 
to perform, while motivating promisee to assist.  
To implement such a contract, we recommend deducting past expenditure on 
incomplete performance, either actual or stipulated, from liability. (We omit the related 
question of deducting from liability other losses suffered by the breaching party.32) The 
justification for this form of decreasing liability over possible alternatives is practical. 
Specifically, this form produces good incentives by using variables that parties have 
experience writing into contracts and courts have experience adjudicating.  
If promisee’s unobservable and unverifiable assistance to promisor is important, 
the parties usually draft a contract requiring progress payments and a completion bonus. 
In the event of premature termination, the promisee cannot recover past progress 
payments, just as the promisee in a decreasing liability contract cannot recover past costs 
when promisor breaches. Furthermore, in the event of premature termination, promisor 
loses the completion bonus, just as the promisor who breaches a decreasing liability 
contract loses his share of the surplus from performance. Consequently, appropriate 
choice of parameters in a progress payment contract will make it materially identical to a 
decreasing liability contract. In our view, the advantage of a decreasing liability contract 
                                                 
32 Thus, the promisor could suffer reliance losses, lost profits, or nonlegal sanctions imposed by third 
parties. Like expenditures on phases of performance, the presence of such losses decrease the level of 
liability required to induce promisor to perform, so a case could be made for deducting these losses from 
liability. We leave this problem to another paper. 
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over a materially equivalent progress payment contract is merely the fact that incentives 
effects are somewhat easier to understand.  
Decreasing liability, or its material equivalence through progress payments, is the 
only practical way for a contract to motivate a promisee whose assistance is unobservable 
or unverifiable. Transaction lawyers who appreciate the problem of promisee’s 
unverifiable assistance will understand better when to use progress payments and how to 
set their magnitude and timing. In some circumstances, transaction lawyers may find that 
switching language from “progress payments” to “decreasing liability” increases the 
contract’s clarity. In addition, courts that understand the purpose of decreasing liability 
and progress payments will interpret and enforce contracts better. Perhaps courts will 
someday adopt decreasing liability as the default rule for damages in some 
circumstances.  
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Appendices 
There are two appendices. Appendix 1 is a more elaborate version of Example 1 
that models promisee’s reliance more explicitly. Appendix 2 provides mathematical 
proofs of the propositions.. 
 
Appendix 1 
Analysis of Example 1 
To keep the analysis of Example 1 simple, we did not explicitly model how 
promisee’s assistance affects the contract’s expected value. In general, promisee’s 
assistance lowers the expected cost of performance. In this appendix, we use a numeric 
example to model promisee’s performance. We elaborate Example 1 and depict the 
contract’s phases explicitly as a tree in Figure 6. 
Example 8: A Construction Contract Occurs in Five Phases— 
Phase 1. Formation. Buyer pays Developer a price p = 90 for promise to 
construct a building. Buyer values the completed project at v = 100. In event of 
Developer’s default at any phase, Buyer will abandon the project without 
receiving any benefit from it.  
Phase 2. Developer spends. Developer either breaches or else spends c2 = 40 on 
architectural drawings and a concrete foundation. Breach terminates the process, 
whereas spending c2 = 40 moves to phase 3. 
Phase 3. Buyer assists. Buyer either does not assist Developer’s performance or 
assists by helping to obtain the necessary construction permits. Assisting costs 
Buyer 5. Developer cannot observe whether or not Buyer assists, so the contract is 
silent on this matter and Buyer has no contractual obligation to assist Developer. 
Phase 4. Nature acts. Unpredictable forces outside the parties’ control, which we 
call “Nature,” determine Developer’s remaining costs of completing the project. 
The state of nature is good, bad, or very bad. The probabilities are denoted qg, qb, 
and qvb, respectively. If Buyer does not assist, the probabilities are (qg, qb, qvb,) = 
(.6,.3,.1). If Buyer assists the probabilities shift in favor of a better state. 
Specifically, if Buyer assists the probabilities are (qg, qb, qvb,) = (.9,.06,.04).  
Phase 5. Developer spends. c5 denotes the expenditures required to complete 
performance at phase 5, which depends on the state of nature. Developer observes 
the state of nature and then he either defaults or completes performance by 
spending c5.  
   A “good” state of nature results in low remaining costs, specifically c5 = 40.  
   A “bad” state results in high remaining costs, specifically c5 = 61.  
   A “very bad” state results in very high remaining costs, specifically c5 = 101.  
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Figure 6: Example 8 as a Tree 
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Assume that the parties want to maximize the expected value of the contract in 
Example 8 when it is formed. When forming the contract, the parties anticipate the 
possibility that Developer receives bad news at phase 5 and defaults. We show that the 
expected value of the contract is higher at the time of formation when Developer’s 
liability for breach at phase 5 equals 60 rather than 100.  
Consider the effects of deducting or not deducting past expenditures on 
Developer’s incentives to perform and Buyer’s incentives to assist. At phase 5, Developer 
applies the decision rule:  
 (c5 < L) => perform 
(c5 > L) => breach. 
 
Depending on whether the state of nature is good, bad, or very bad at phase 5, the 
remaining costs of performance equal 40, 61, or 101, respectively.  
Consider Developer’s incentives with deduction of costs from liability. Expectation 
damages written L = v, equal 100. Consequently, expectation damages without deduction 
exceed the cost of performance in a good state or a bad state, but the cost of performance 
in a very bad state exceeds expectation damages. Thus expectation damages without any 
deduction causes developer to perform when the state of nature is good or bad, and to 
breach when the state of nature is very bad.  
Developer’s behavior differs in one respect when liability equals expectation 
damages minus past expenditures, written L = v – c2,. At phase 5 expectation damages of 
100 minus Developer’s past expenditures of 40 equal 60. As a result of the deduction, the 
cost of performance in a bad state, which is 61, exceeds liability. Deduction changes 
promisor’s performance when the state of nature is bad, but not otherwise, as depicted in 
Figure 5 above.  
Now we relate Developer’s behavior to the contract’s value. Maximizing the 
contract’s value at phase 5 requires Developer to perform if the value of performance to 
Buyer exceeds the remaining cost of performance to Developer. The value of 
performance exceeds the remaining cost of performance in a good state or a bad state, but 
not in a very bad state. So maximizing the contract’s value requires Developer to perform 
in a good or bad state, and to breach in a very bad state. Expectation damages, produce 
incentives for efficient behavior by Developer in all three circumstances, whereas 
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expectation damages with a deduction of past expenditures creates efficient behavior in 
good or very bad states, but not in bad states.  
Next we turn from Developer’s to Buyer’s incentives. We show that expectation 
damages with no deduction cause Buyer not to assist in Example 8, and expectation 
damages with deduction of past expenditures cause Buyer to assist. Consider each 
damage measure. With expectation damages and no deduction, Buyer receives 100 from 
performance of the contract and 100 in damages from breach. Consequently, Buyer gains 
nothing from spending 5 to assist Developer. While expectation damages give Buyer no 
incentive to assist, the situation is different when Developer deducts past expenditures of 
40 from expectation damages of 100. With deduction, Buyer receives 100 from 
performance of the contract and 60 in damages from breach. By spending 5 to assist 
performance, Buyer expects to gain by increasing the probability of receiving 100 instead 
of 60. The expected gain exceeds the cost of 5.33 Consequently, deduction motivates 
Buyer to assist.  
Note that Nature’s random influence prevents Developer from inferring from his 
costs whether or not Buyer assisted. Buyer’s assistance is thus unobservable directly or 
by inference.  
We have explained that deducting Developer’s expenditures on performance from 
liability for breach causes Buyer to assist and Developer sometimes to breach 
inefficiently. It is easy to show that the gain from improving promisee’s incentives 
exceeds the expected loss from worsening promisor’s incentives. Specifically, with 
deduction the contract’s expected value equals 9, and without deduction the contract’s 
expected value equals 7.7.34  
                                                 
33  Specifically, the expected gain equals (.9-.6)(100-60)=12, whereas the cost equals 5. 
34  With deduction, the expected value of the contract equals .9(100-40)+.06(0)+.04(0)-5-40=9. 
Without deduction, the expected value of the contract equals .6(100-40)+.3(100-61)+.1(0)-40=7.7.  
 
 39
Appendix 2 
Mathematical Appendix 
 Part III is based on a model without phased performance. Parts IV and V extend 
this model to encompass phased performance. We develop each model in turn. 
 
Model Without Phased Performance Used in Part III 
 
Definition 
v = promisee’s value of performance. 
c = promisor’s expenditure on performance. 
a = promisee’s expenditure on assistance. 
q = probability of performance 
   = q(c,a). 
L = promisor’s liability for breach. 
D = promisee’s entitlement to damages for breach. 
 
Behavioral Assumptions: 
Promisor chooses c to minimize –(1 – q(c,a))L – c. Let the solution be given by c = c(L), 
where we assume c` > 0.  
Promisee chooses a to maximize vq(c,a) + D(1 – q(c,a)) – a, where a > 0. Let the solution 
be given by a = a(D), where we assume that a`< 0. Note D = v implies the solution a = 0. 
 
Proposition 1: Assume that promisor’s liability for breach equals expectation damages. 
Also assume the first dollar spent by promisee on assisting performance increases the 
contract’s value by more than the last dollar spent by promisor on performing. Given 
these assumptions, a small reduction in damages increases the contract’s expected value. 
 
Proof: 
1. The contract’s net expected value equals vq(c,a) – c – a. Assume that liability 
equals expectation damages: L = D = v.  
2. Now consider the consequences of a small change in liability. Fully differentiate 
to obtain: 
 (vq1 – 1)c`dL + (vq2 – 1)a`dL  
3. Assuming that expectation damages are optimal, the preceding expression 
nonpositive, so we have 
(vq1 – 1)c` < – (vq2 – 1)a`.  
4. The left side of this expression is the marginal value of more effort by promisor to 
perform, and the right side of this expression is the marginal value of more effort 
by promisee to assist. Thus the preceding expression contradicts the assumption 
that promisee’s first dollar spent on assisting promisor increases the contract’s 
expected value by more than a dollar. Hence reducing damages below expectation 
damages will increase the contract’s value. 
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Model of Phased Performance Used in Parts IV and V  
 
Additional Definitions 
p = contract price. 
t = present time. 
T = number of phases in the contract. 
ki = actual expenditures in past at time i, where i < t and ki  > 0. 
Kj = total past expenditures as of time j 
         j 
     = Σ ki 
i = 1. 
ei = expenditures necessary in phase i to continue on to phase i + 1, where ei > 0. 
qt,t+i = qt,t+i (et+i)  
        = probability at time t that expenditures necessary in phase t + i to go on to phase t + 
i + 1 will equal et+i. 
ct,t+i = ∫qt,t+i(et+i)et+id et+i 
          = expectation at time t of expenditures necessary in phase t + i to continue on to 
phase t + i + 1. 
            T – t – 1 
Ct,t+i = Σ ct,t+i+j 
               j = 1 
        =expectation at time t of total expenditures remaining at time t + i to complete 
performance. 
TCt = Kt + Ct,t  
       = past expenditure + plus expected remaining expenditures 
       = expected total costs of performance at time t.  
Lt = liability for breach at time t.  
Lt = v = expectation damages. 
Lt = v – Ktm = m expectation damages minus past expenditures on performance. 
 
Behavioral Assumptions: 
1. Formation: The parties form a contract if the expected cost of performance to promisor 
is less than its value to promisee: 
  C0 < v = > form contract.       (1)  
2. Bargain: The contract price lies between the promisor’s expected cost of performance 
and the promisee’s value of performance:  
C0 < p < v.         (2)  
3. Performance: At each phase t, promisor decides whether to default or spend the 
amount necessary to go forward according to whether the expected remaining 
expenditures exceed liability, which we write 
  Ct < Lt    =>    continue performing.      (3) 
  Ct > Lt    =>    default. 
 
Proposition 2: With each phase of the contract, the expected liability required to induce 
performance decreases. 
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1. The expected change in expected future costs between time t and t+1 equals 
Ct,t+i – Ct,t+i+1. 
2. By definition of variables, Ct,t+i – Ct,t+1+1 = ct,t+i, where ct,t+i > 0. 
3. Consequently, Ct,t+i > Ct,t+i+1.  
4. By decision rule (3), the smallest expected liability necessary to induce 
performance at any stage t equals the expected remaining costs.  
5. The two preceding steps prove the conclusion. 
 
Proposition 3. If past expenditures are deducted from expectation damages, and if 
promisor correctly estimates future costs of performance, then promisor performs at 
every phase of the contract.  
1. According to the bargain condition in expression (2), we have C0 < p < v. 
2. By assumption, costs sunk as of i are the same as anticipated at 0, so  
C0 = Kj + Ci,j, for all i, j.  
3. Combining the two preceding expressions yields Kj + Ci,j < v, which implies 
Ci,j < v – Ki. 
4. By assumption that liability equals expectation damages minus past expenditures, 
we have Lj = v – Kj. 
5. Combining the two preceding expressions yields the condition for promisor to 
decide to perform rather than breach: Ci,j < Lj. This is true for all times i, j.  
 
Proposition 4: Assume that liability equals expectation damages minus past expenditures. 
Also make certain reasonable assumptions about the probability of errors in predictions. 
Then the longer the contract progresses as predicted, the lower the probability of breach.  
1. Assume the contract progresses as predicted to time t-1. If the contract progresses 
another period as predicted, then expectations are confirmed: Ct–1,t = Ct,t.  
2. If, however, the promisor receives bad new that causes him to revise his cost 
estimate upwards, then Ct–1,t < Ct,t.  
3. The increase in expected future costs due to the bad news equals Ct,t – Ct-1,t.  
4. By assumption, the liability rule is Lt = v – Kt and the breach condition at time t is 
Ct,t > Lt. So breach will occur if Ct,t> v – Kt.  (Note that this is the condition for a 
losing contract.)  
5. Subtract Ct–1,t from both sides of the preceding inequality:   Ct,t – Ct–1,t > v-Kt – 
Ct–1,t. 
6. Substitute TCt-1=Kt +Ct-1,t into the preceding inequality to obtain (Ct,t – Ct-1,t) > v 
– TCt–1.  
 v – TCt–1 is the margin of error, which, if exceeded by expected future costs, 
causes breach . 
7. Using the definitions,  T – t   T – t   T – t 
Ct,t – Ct-1,t = Σ ct,t+j – Σ ct-1,t+j = Σ ∫[qt,t+i(et+i) – qt-1,t+i(et+i)]et+id et+i 
                      j = 1        j = 1          j = 1.  
For larger t, the sum is over fewer phases. Under reasonable assumptions about 
the distribution of errors, the cumulative effect of bad news is smaller for fewer 
phases. Hence the longer the contract proceeds as expected, the lower the 
probability of future breach. 
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Proposition 5: For any decreasing liability contract, there exists a progress payment 
contract with materially equivalent incentives for promisor’s performance and promisee’s 
assistance, and vice versa. 
 
Proof:  
1. Consider a contract requiring phased expenditures by promisor designated 
(c1,c2,..,cT), whose completion has value V to promisee.  
2. Let Cm,n denote the sum of costs between m and n, or (cm + cm+1 + cm+2 +…+ cn), 
for any m and n between 1 and T. 
3. Let Pm,n denote the sum of periodic payments promisee makes promisor between 
m and n, or = (pm + pm+1 + pm+2 +…+ pn), for any m and n between 1 and T. 
4. A decreasing liability contract and a progress payment contract are defined a 
stream of net payoffs to promisee and promisor. Columns (1), (2), and (3) in the 
following table define these two contracts by representing net payoffs at 
arbitrarily chosen time t.  
5. Column (2) represents future payoffs expected at time t from completing 
performance, and column (3) represents future payoffs expected at time t from 
terminating performance at time t. Column (4) depicts the difference, when 
determines promisor’s incentives to complete performance and promisee’s 
incentives to assist. 
6. Choose the periodic payments in period 1 to T – 1 to equal costs: pi = ci for i = 
1,2,…,T – 1.  Choose the periodic payment in period T to equal cost in period T 
plus a completion bonus equal to the difference between the value of performance 
to promisee and contracts total cost: pT = cT + V – C1,T.  
7. By definition, cT = C1,T – C1,T–1.). From this fact and the preceding step, the sum 
of all past costs C1,t and future payments Pt,T equals value V of performance: V = 
C1,t + Pt,T. This is the condition under which the difference in promisee’s 
incentives given in column (4) are the same under DLC and PLC. 
8. Total past costs as of t, denoted C1,t, equal total costs of the project C1,T minus 
future costs of completion Ct,T. Substitute this fact into step 7 to obtain V= –Ct,T + 
C1,T + Pt,T. This is the condition under which the difference in promisor’s 
incentives given in column (4) are the same under DLC and PLC. 
9. If the difference in net payoffs given in column (4) for promisor and promisee is 
same under the two contracts, their incentive effects are equivalent. 
 
(1) 
party and contract 
(2) 
future payoff from 
completing 
performance 
(3) 
future payoff from 
terminating 
performance 
(4) 
difference between  
(2) and (3)  
(i) Promisor in DLC  –Ct,T –(V – C1,t) V – C1,T 
(ii) Promisee in DLC V (V – C1,t) C1,t 
(iii) Promisor PPC Pt,T – Ct,T  0 Pt,T – Ct,T 
(iv) Promisee in PPC V – Pt,T 0 V – Pt,T 
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